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Introduction
In 2002, Germany enacted a Corporate Governance Code ("the code") that lists a number of recommendations and suggestions, the application of which is deemed to improve the governance of listed firms. Compliance with the code is not mandatory. Rather, listed firms have to publish an annual declaration of conformity that states their degree of compliance.
This is referred to as the "comply-or-explain" principle.
The decision whether or not to comply with a particular recommendation or suggestion is likely to be non-random. Managers may exert their discretion to escape stringent monitoring.
Therefore, the degree of compliance with the code is potentially informative about the amount of leeway that managers have. Consequently, recommendations in the code that aim at the disclosure of information are unlikely to yield unbiased results because the sample of disclosing firms is likely to be biased.
Disclosure that is prompted by a comply-or-explain rule is, in a sense, voluntary disclosure.
Models such as those of Grossman and Hart (1980) , Grossman (1981) , or Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) predict that when the cost of disclosing is low and the information can be verified easily, all firms (with the potential exception of the worst firms) will ultimately choose to disclose. 1 If firms decide sequentially, we might expect to observe unravelling -the earlier a firm discloses, the "better" the firm.
The present paper considers a very interesting case study. Since its inception, the code has required that firms disclose the remuneration of their executive directors on an individual basis. 2 However, only a small minority of firms (22 out of 146 in our 2003 sample) actually complied with this requirement. The government took the low number of complying firms as 2 evidence that the comply-or-explain principle had failed in this particular case and introduced a new law, which requires that, starting with the fiscal year beginning in 2006, the annual report state the remuneration of executive directors on an individual basis. However, the law also contains a "loophole provision" that allows the shareholders' meeting to grant an exemption from the disclosure requirement.
The disclosure of executive compensation on an individual basis is an issue where the shareholders' transparency requirement is opposed to the managers' right to privacy. There are several reasons why disclosure is important for shareholders. First and foremost, the shareholders are the ultimate employers of the managers and thus ultimately pay their salaries.
Second, shareholders require detailed and individualized information on executive pay in order to evaluate whether the right incentives are in place. An optimal compensation package may require that different members of the management team receive different salaries because they may differ with respect to their tasks, qualifications, or performance. Similarly, it may be optimal to set different incentives at different points in an executive's work-life cycle. For example, empirical evidence suggests that managers who are close to retirement might behave opportunistically in response to earnings-based incentives (Dechow and Sloan 1991 , Gibbons and Murphy 1992 , Murphy and Zimmerman 1993 .
In the US, publicly listed firms have been subject to extensive disclosure requirements on executive remuneration for a long time. Recent changes to the rules that require disclosure of executive and director compensation indicate that the SEC regards information about executive compensation as very important. A press release relating to these changes (release Investors have made it clear that disclosure about executive compensation and related matters is very important to them.
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The same release cites SEC Chairman Christopher Cox:
With more than 20,000 comments, and counting, it is now official that no issue in the 72 years of the Commission's history has generated such interest... The better information that both shareholders and boards of directors will get as a result of these new rules will help them make better decisions about the appropriate amount to pay the men and women entrusted with running their companies.
Shareholders need intelligible disclosure that can be understood by a lay reader...
It thus seems safe to assume that shareholders prefer disclosure. By contrast, the fact that firms apparently do not disclose voluntarily, but have to be forced to disclose by the regulator, lends support to the view that managers are opposed to disclosure. The German evidence referred to above is a case in point.
We 2003. The probability of disclosure is low for firms that have either a dispersed ownership structure or a high ownership concentration. It is highest at medium levels of free float (slightly below 60%). This is consistent with the fact that managers in firms that have dispersed ownership have more leeway. On the other hand, shareholders who have very large 4 ownership stakes are informed about managerial compensation anyway (they are typically represented on the supervisory board) and therefore do not need to pressure for disclosure in the annual report.
In the 2005 sample, the relation between ownership concentration and the decision to file for exemption appears to be positive and linear. We offer the following explanation. Managers of companies that have concentrated ownership can easily communicate with their shareholders and will only file for exemption if these shareholders signal their approval. The managers of companies that have more dispersed ownership cannot easily communicate with their shareholders. They might be afraid that their request will be turned down in the shareholders' meeting and may thus refrain from putting the item on the agenda.
These results have important implications that extend far beyond the issue of individualized disclosure of executive compensation. They cast doubt on the effectiveness of a comply-orexplain type of regulation per se. In contrast to the US, where compliance with corporate governance rules is generally mandatory and based on legal provisions, corporate governance practices in Europe are, to a large extent, founded upon the comply-or-explain principle. 3 In addition to Germany, the corporate governance codes of many major EU economies (for example, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK) are based on this principle.
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Our study is related to previous research on the degree of compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code, and on the relation between code compliance and firm performance (Bassen et al. 2004 , 2007 , Drobetz et al. 2004 , Nowak et al. 2004a , 2004b , 2006 , Oser et al. 2004 that comes closest to ours is Drobetz et al. (2005) . They analyze the determinants of the corporate governance rating developed in Drobetz et al. (2004) . However, the disclosure of executive compensation on an individual level is just one among a total of 30 criteria and is not analyzed separately.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the institutional and regulatory setting in Germany. Section 3 develops arguments for, and presents, the hypotheses. Section 4 contains a description of our sample and data sources. In Section 5, we present descriptive statistics and the results of our multivariate logit analysis. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Background
In 2001, the Minister of Justice appointed a commission whose mandate was to improve the governance of German listed corporations. Among the members of the commission were several current and former executives, a representative of the auditing profession, a representative of the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB), and two academics. In February 2002, the commission presented the initial version of the German Corporate Governance Code. The code contains sections on shareholders and the general meeting, the cooperation between management board and supervisory board, the management board, the supervisory board, 5 transparency, and the reporting and auditing of the annual financial statements. Each section contains a list of recommendations and suggestions that are deemed to constitute good corporate governance.
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The management board (Vorstand) is composed of the executive directors of the firm. The supervisory board is composed of shareholder and employee representatives. The shareholder representatives are appointed by the shareholders' general meeting. Typically, large shareholders will be represented on the supervisory board. However, this is not a formal requirement. Employee representation is mandated by the German codetermination laws. Among the tasks of the supervisory board are the appointment, monitoring, and dismissal of the members of the management board. The Stock Corporation Act requires that the supervisory boards of listed firms hold at least two meetings per year. The actual number of meetings is higher than this legally required minimum, but is lower than the number of board meetings of US corporations. A person cannot be a member of both the management board and the supervisory board.
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The requirements and suggestions in the code are not compulsory. However, article 161 of the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), amended in 2002, requires that listed firms publish an annual declaration of conformity. The statement must contain the information that the recommendations of the code "have been and are being complied with or which of the code's recommendations are not being applied."
6 Firms do not need to disclose whether a suggestion has or has not been followed. The declaration of conformity is signed jointly by the management board and the supervisory board and must be made permanently accessible to shareholders. Although not explicitly required by the law, the statement typically explains why a certain recommendation has not been applied.
The underlying principle of combining non-compulsory rules with the requirement to publish a statement of conformity is referred to as the "comply-or-explain" principle. Although largely absent in the US, 7 the comply-or-explain principle is widely used in Europe. Translation of Art. 161 Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act) adopted from http://www.corporategovernance-code.de/eng/entsprechenserklaerung/index.html, the official homepage of the corporate governance commission. 7 The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) contains only two provisions that are similar to the "comply-or-explain" principle. Section 407a (Disclosure of Audit Committee Financial Expert) states: "The Commission shall issue rules… to require each issuer… to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at least 1 member who is a financial expert…" Section 406a (Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers) contains a similar provision. 7 declaration of conformity did not need to state whether the suggestion was applied. However, the law also contains a provision that allows the shareholders' meeting to grant an exemption from the publication requirement. Managers who seek exemption from the reporting requirement for the 2006 financial report need to receive approval from a 75% majority at the 2006 shareholders' meeting. Approval can be granted for no more than five years, but can be renewed.
We can thus identify four regulatory regimes. Until 2002, firms were free to decide whether or not to disclose the individual compensation of the members of the management board.
Checking the 2001 annual statements reveals that only one of our sample firms opted for full disclosure and one additional firm disclosed the compensation of the CEO. Because of this small number of observations, we did not include the 2001 data in our analysis.
From 2002 to 2003, individualized disclosure was included in the code as a suggestion. Of our sample firms, eight firms followed the suggestion fully and an additional two firms disclosed 9 Note, though, that one can check whether the suggestion was applied by referring to the notes of the annual report.
8 the compensation of the CEO. In 2003, individualized disclosure was included in the code as a recommendation and non-compliance had to be reported in the declaration of conformity.
The number of disclosing firms increased to 22. Since 2006, individualized disclosure has been a legal requirement that can be overruled by the shareholders' meeting. Forty out of 140 firms took advantage of this provision to opt out.
Hypotheses
We hold that the decision made by a firm as to whether or not to disclose the remuneration of its executives on an individual basis depends on the characteristics of the firm. In this section, we argue for this claim and derive testable hypotheses.
Previous academic research suggests that the level of information asymmetries between firms and (potential) investors is generally smaller for large firms (Petersen and Rajan 1992) . Given that information asymmetries are related positively to the cost of external financing, firms have an incentive to convey private information to the market in order to reduce the information asymmetries. Financial analysts play an important role in collecting and disseminating information and thereby help to mitigate information asymmetries. In a model of the determinants of analyst coverage, Bushan (1989) shows that the extent to which analysts follow a firm is related positively to size. Bushan (1989) and Rock et al. (2001) confirm this prediction empirically and find a highly significant and positive relationship between the number of analysts and firm size. In addition, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) suggest that increased coverage by analysts improves liquidity and attracts supposedly better informed institutional investors.
These findings suggest that large firms and firms that are more closely followed by analysts are subject to more intense monitoring by institutional investors and the general public. We therefore expect them to be under stronger pressure to comply with the regulation than smaller firms and formulate the following hypothesis: 9 H1: The probability of disclosure is higher for larger firms and for firms followed by more analysts.
Note that the term "higher probability of disclosure" refers to a) a higher probability that a firm discloses the managerial compensation individually in the 2002 and 2003 annual reports and b) a lower probability that the firm files for exemption from the legal disclosure requirement in the 2006 shareholders' meeting.
We use three alternative measures of firm size: the market value of equity, the book value of assets, and the number of employees. We use the number of analyst reports as a measure of analyst coverage.
It is a frequent perception that German accounting standards are not tuned to the informational requirements of investors in financial markets, and that financial statements based on German accounting standards are considered to be less informative than those based on international accounting standards. 10 In a study on the relative informativeness of accounting disclosures in different countries, Alford et al. (1993) show that earnings figures that are based on German accounting rules are less value-relevant than US GAAP earnings. In
and 2003, firms had a choice of whether to use German accounting standards or apply international accounting rules (IFRS/IAS or US-GAAP).
In addition to voluntarily applying international accounting standards, companies might signal better corporate governance practices through cross-listings. The literature on cross-listings (see Karolyi 2006 for a recent survey) states that one motive for firms to list their shares on an exchange that has stronger disclosure requirements is to signal their quality. Coffee (1999 Coffee ( , 2002 and Stulz (1999) suggest that by cross-listing, firms "bond" to a legal and regulatory system and (among other things) commit themselves to more rigorous disclosure.
We expect that as these firms subject themselves voluntarily to more stringent publication requirements, they will also comply with the rules of the code. We therefore formulate the following hypothesis:
H2: The probability of disclosure is higher for firms that voluntarily adopt higher disclosure standards.
We test this hypothesis through two proxy variables. The first proxy is a dummy variable that is set to 1 for firms with a cross-listing on the NYSE (arguably the exchange that has the highest disclosure requirements). It is important to note that, even though firms that are listed The level of executive compensation has become a subject of public debate in Germany.
There appears to be a general feeling that salaries are too high. In his defence during the trial, Mr. Esser argued that it was not the magnitude of the bonus, but its public disclosure alone, that had led to the criminal charges (Jenkins and Major 2004) .
Even though the defendants were acquitted of criminal acts in 2004, the trial sensitised politicians and the general public to the issue of executive pay. Due to the public attention and the (perceived) risk of being charged with a breach of fiduciary duty, managers in firms that provide higher per-capita remuneration might be more reluctant to disclose their individual salaries. We therefore formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: The probability of disclosure decreases as the average per-capita executive compensation increases.
Firm performance is another potential determinant of the probability of disclosure. Miller (2002) provides evidence that indicates that firms increase disclosure in response to earnings increases. During periods of earnings increases, levels of disclosure are not only higher with respect to financial information (e.g. earnings or sales forecasts) but also with respect to the voluntary disclosure of non-financial information (e.g. personnel changes). As earnings begin to decline, voluntary disclosure decreases and firms are shown to return to a lower level of disclosure. In addition, Drobetz el al. (2004) document a positive relationship between past stock returns and a corporate governance rating for German firms. These findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between firm performance (both in terms of market-based and accounting-based measures) and the level of disclosure. Given the high degree of public attention given to executive remuneration in Germany, it also seems likely that higher compensation packages are justified more easily when profitability is high. Therefore, we expect the probability of disclosure to be related positively to measures of firm performance, and we expect that the probability that a firm files for exemption from the disclosure requirement is related negatively to these measures:
H4: The probability of disclosure is related positively to firm performance.
We use two measures of performance: the return on book equity, defined as net earnings divided by the book value of equity, and the index-adjusted stock return measured over the fiscal year.
The ownership structure of the firm may have an impact on the decision whether or not to comply with the regulation. In principle, external shareholders should seek increases in the level of disclosure by their firm, given that greater disclosure is related positively to share prices (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, Bartov and Bodnar 1996) . However, in firms in which ownership is less concentrated, control incentives for shareholders are usually low (Shleifer and Vishny 1986) and managers consequently have a lot of leeway. We thus expect managers in firms in which ownership is dispersed widely to be less willing to disclose their compensation on an individual basis in the 2003 annual report. On the other hand, large shareholders are in a position to put pressure on managers and to force disclosure. We therefore expect a positive relation between ownership concentration and the probability of disclosure. However, a very large shareholder does not have to rely on information published in the annual report and so will not be likely to try to force disclosure. For example, a 13 controlling shareholder will typically be represented on the supervisory board. Given that either the supervisory board or a committee consisting of some of its members decides upon the executive compensation, the controlling shareholder may be informed about the remuneration packages even if they are not disclosed publicly. Controlling shareholders might even be able to extract meaningful private benefits from the firm and seek lower disclosure in order to protect their consumption of perks from scrutiny (Doidge et al. 2004) . For this reason, the relation between measures of ownership concentration and the probability of disclosure may become negative at very high levels of ownership concentration. In line with these arguments, Makhija and Patton (2004) provide evidence that suggests that public disclosure is related positively to external ownership at low levels of ownership and related negatively to external ownership if very large blockholders are present.
We do not expect a similar relation to hold between ownership concentration and the probability of disclosure in the 2005 sample. A manager who wants to avoid disclosure has to present the issue to the shareholders' meeting. Managers of firms that have large shareholders may communicate with these shareholders and elicit their opinion before filing for exemption.
In this case, managers are only expected to file for exemption if the large shareholders have signalled their approval. By contrast, managers in firms in which ownership is dispersed widely cannot easily communicate with shareholders and therefore face the risk of being turned down at the shareholders meeting. Given the publicity that such an event would entail, managers of firms in which ownership is dispersed widely may well refrain from filing for exemption. These arguments lead us to formulate the following hypothesis: The measure we use to test this hypothesis is the free float, which is an inverse measure of the degree of ownership concentration.
14 The cost of disclosing the executive compensation is low and this information is likely to be easily verifiable. In these circumstances, theoretical models such as those of Grossman and Hart (1980) , Grossman (1981 ), or Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990 might lead us to expect that all firms (with the potential exception of the worst firms) will ultimately choose to disclose.
To test these predictions, we include Tobin's Q as a measure of valuation in the set of explanatory variables and formulate the following hypothesis:
H6: The probability of disclosure is higher for firms with higher Tobin's Q.
However, it is not entirely clear that the models referred to above apply to the present context.
Although disclosure may cause little or no cost to the firm, it does cause non-monetary costs to the managers. Further, information on executive compensation is not related directly to the value of the firm. It is thus not obvious that firms of higher quality have a stronger incentive to disclose. There may, however, be an indirect link between disclosure and firm value.
Assuming that shareholders prefer disclosure and managers prefer non-disclosure, owners of disclosing firms are likely to monitor the management more efficiently. Thus these firms have lower agency cost of equity which, in turn, may affect valuation (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, Bartov and Bodnar 1996) . Healy et al. (1999) find that firms that increase their voluntary disclosure experience significant increases in stock prices, irrespective of current earnings performance. Yet even in this case, the cost of disclosure is borne by management, while the benefits accrue largely to the shareholders. Thus, whether or not a firm discloses will depend on the intensity of monitoring and (the flip side of the coin) the amount of leeway that managers have. Our empirical analysis includes ownership concentration as a measure of the monitoring intensity (H5). If managers hold large equity stakes or if their compensation depends strongly on the share price, they may have an incentive to disclose voluntarily. In order to control for these effects, we include in the set of explanatory variables a managerial 15 ownership variable and a dummy variable that is set to 1 if there is a stock option plan, and formulate the following hypothesis:
H7: The probability of disclosure is higher for firms in which managerial wealth or income is related more closely to the stock price.
Data
We study the disclosing behaviour of German firms by considering three cross-sections. Our 12 The DAX (largest firms), MDAX (mid caps), and SDAX (small caps) are the three major indexes of Deutsche Börse for firms from classic sectors. 13 Klöckner-Werke AG does not publish the aggregate executive compensation on the grounds that only one (out of a total of four) executive director receives his remuneration from the firm. In this case, disclosing the aggregate amount of executive compensation would be equivalent to disclosure on an individual basis. Due to the fact that the average per-capita executive remuneration is one of our explanatory variables, Klöckner-Werke AG has to be excluded from the sample. 14 As noted in Section 2, disclosure of the aggregate executive remuneration is mandated by the German Commercial Code. Thus, firms have to disclose the aggregate board remuneration even if they decide not to voluntarily disclose individual figures. We combine the information on aggregate compensation with information on the number of board members to compute the average per-capita remuneration for all sample firms.
As mentioned above, publicly listed companies can file for an exemption from the disclosure of individual executive remuneration, which is otherwise mandatory from the 2006 annual report onwards. In order to circumvent disclosure, the approval of at least 75% of the voting capital represented at the 2006 shareholders' meeting is required. In the invitation to the 2006 shareholders' meeting, it is stated whether or not the management wish to file for exemption.
We collected this information for our sample firms. In most cases, firms report the results of the votes on their websites. In other cases, the results on the opting-out decision was obtained from the companies' investor relations department.
We obtained data on the ownership concentration from Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. 15 Data on the size of the executive board (to calculate per-capita compensation) and on the accounting standard used (German or international, i.e., IFRS/IAS or US-GAAP) was collected from the same source. Stock prices and balance sheet information were taken from Datastream. We used the CDAX performance index to adjust stock returns. The number of analysts that follow each firm was obtained from the Institutional Broker's Estimate System (I/B/E/S). the compensation of the members of the management board on an individual basis. Two of these firms published the compensation of the chair of the management board, but not the 15 We use the free float as our measure of the ownership concentration. It is defined as the fraction of equity that is not held by large shareholders. Large shareholders are shareholders who hold more than 5% of the equity. Until the beginning of 2007, shareholdings below 5% did not have to be reported to the German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). This data limitation affects the free float variable as well as the managerial ownership variable used to test Hypothesis 7. The Hoppenstedt Aktienführer is a yearly publication that provides detailed information (e.g., ownership structure, board composition, balance sheet information) on German listed firms.
Results
Univariate Analysis
other members of the board. We categorized these firms as disclosing firms. 16 In 2003, the number of disclosing firms increased to 22 (15%).
Please insert We use three measures of firm size: the market value of equity, the book value of assets, and the number of employees. Disclosing firms appear to be larger, although the differences are significant for only one of the measures. In addition, the free float is higher among disclosing firms (yet only weakly significant in 2003). Further, disclosing firms are followed by a larger number of analysts, and have a higher Q. These results are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 6. We do not find significant differences in the two performance measures and the executive shareholdings. 17 There is thus no support for Hypothesis 4.
For the 2003 sample, we provide additional information on those firms that already disclosed in 2002. Consistent with the unravelling hypothesis, they have a higher Q than the group of all firms that disclosed in 2003 (and thus, in particular, have a higher Q than those firms that 16 The results of our analysis remain unchanged when we a) classify these firms as non-disclosing or b) eliminate them from the sample. 17 The differences in the return on book equity are large, but insignificant (mainly because of large variability among the non-disclosing firms). The difference is not driven by firms from a specific industry (e.g., banks).
disclosed for the first time in 2003). These firms are also followed by more analysts and have higher per-capita executive compensation. shareholders' meeting. In three cases, the item was eliminated from the agenda shortly before the meeting, probably due to opposition by shareholders. 18 We treated these firms as nondisclosing firms, because the management initially filed for exemption. Treating them as disclosing firms or eliminating them from the sample does not change the results materially.
The sub-sample of disclosing firms (firms that did not file for exemption) contains a larger proportion of NYSE-listed firms and a larger proportion of firms that have a stock option plan in place. This is consistent with our Hypotheses 2 and 7. Consistent with the results for 2002 and 2003, but in contrast to Hypothesis 3, the average per-capita compensation is higher for disclosing firms. Again, it should be noted that the univariate analysis does not control for firm size. In addition, the disclosing firms are larger, followed by more analysts, and have a higher free float and thus less concentrated ownership. These findings are in line with Hypotheses 1 and 5. There are no significant differences for the remaining variables. Thus, we do not find support for Hypotheses 4 and 6.
Logit Models
The descriptive analysis presented thus far does not control for interdependencies between the independent variables. We therefore estimate logit models in which the disclosure decision is the dependent variable.
The right-hand-side variables include one measure of firm size, one measure of firm performance, Tobin's Q, the natural logarithm of the per-capita executive compensation, the free float and the squared free float (in order to account for nonlinearity in the relation between ownership structure and the disclosure decision), the percentage of shares held by executives, the number of analysts following, and dummy variables identifying firms that use
German accounting standards (only in the 2003 sample 19 ), firms the shares of which are listed on the NYSE, and firms that have a stock option plan in place.
We have three firm size measures and two performance measures. In order to avoid multicolinearity, we included only one size measure and one performance measure in any individual regression. This results in a total of six models.
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The results for the 2002 sample are not reported in detail, because only 7% of the sample firms disclose executive remuneration individually. Only Tobin's Q has explanatory power for the disclosure decision. Firms that have a higher valuation are more likely to disclose. All other explanatory variables are insignificant. In fact, if we re-estimate the model without Tobin's Q, a likelihood ratio test does not reject the null hypothesis that the independent variables are jointly insignificant for three of the six models at the 10% level.
When interpreting these results, it should be kept in mind that in 2002 the code only suggested the individual disclosure of the compensation of the members of the management board. The declaration of conformity did not need to state whether the suggestion was followed. Thus, in a sense, disclosure was voluntary. Our finding that firms with a higher Q are more likely to disclose is thus supportive of the predictions of voluntary disclosure models (Hypothesis 6). It should be noted, though, that the low fraction of disclosing firms in the 2002 sample reduces the explanatory power of the model. Table 3 reports the results for the 2003 sample. A likelihood ratio test easily rejects the null hypothesis that the independent variables do not have explanatory power. We note that neither the size nor the performance measure is significant in any of the six models. The same applies to the executive shareholdings, the number of analysts following, and the dummy variables that identify firms that use German accounting standards, firms with a NYSE listing, and firms that have a stock option plan in place.
As in the 2002 sample, the coefficient on Tobin's Q is positive and significant. We further find a negative and significant relation between the average per-capita compensation of the members of the management board and the probability of disclosure.
The relation between the free float and the probability of disclosure is non-linear and significant. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients suggest that the probability of disclosure is low for firms that have dispersed ownership, increases with ownership concentration up to a maximum level, and then decreases again. The probability of disclosure is highest for levels of free float slightly below 60%. 21 This result is consistent with managers in firms in which ownership is dispersed widely having a high degree of leeway. When ownership concentration increases, managers face increasing pressure to comply with the disclosure requirement. However, at very high levels of ownership concentration (i.e., low free float), the dominant shareholders do not have to rely on published information (e.g.
because they are represented on the supervisory board) and therefore does not seem to pressure for disclosure.
In summary, the results for the 2003 sample provide support for Hypotheses 3 (average compensation), 5 (ownership concentration) and 6 (firms with higher Tobin's Q are more likely to disclose voluntarily).
Please insert Table 3 about here The results for the 2005 sample are shown in Table 4 . The dependent variable is set to 1 if a firm does not file for exemption from the legal disclosure requirement. With this definition of the left-hand-side variable, we expect the same coefficient signs as before. Again, the null hypothesis that the independent variables do not have explanatory power is easily rejected.
The logit models for the 2005 sample include one additional control variable, a dummy that indicates whether or not a firm disclosed in the previous year. This variable turns out to be positive and highly significant.
22
The positive coefficients on two of the size measures (market capitalization and number of employees) suggest that large firms are more likely to disclose executive compensation on an individual basis, i.e. they are less likely to file for exemption from the legal disclosure requirement. This supports Hypothesis 1.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3 and the results for the 2003 sample, we find that the coefficient on per-capita executive remuneration is always negative and significant in five out of six 22 We could not include a dummy variable for disclosure in the previous year in the other two models because of the separation problem addressed earlier. models. Thus, firms that have higher average executive compensation are less likely to disclose.
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The coefficient on the free float variable is positive and significant, whereas the squared term is insignificant. The relation between ownership concentration and the disclosure decision thus appears to be linear. Additional regressions without the squared term (not reported) confirm this pattern and show highly significant (at the 0.01-level) coefficients for the free float variable in all model specifications. This implies that firms that have greater free float, and thus a more dispersed ownership structure, are more likely to disclose. As already noted, managers of firms in which ownership is dispersed widely may refrain from filing for exemption because of the risk of being turned down in the shareholders' meeting.
The other explanatory variables are insignificant. Thus, we do not find support for Hypotheses 2, 4, 6, or 7. The fact that Tobin's Q is insignificant may be surprising, given the results for the 2002 and 2003 samples. We should keep in mind, though, that we are considering a regulatory regime in which disclosure is mandated by law. Thus, and notwithstanding the opting-out clause, it is not obvious that a hypothesis that builds on the voluntary disclosure literature is appropriate.
Please insert Table 4 about here 23 In additional regressions (not reported), we analyze whether the difference in per-capita remuneration between disclosing and non-disclosing firms is also economically significant. Hence, we estimate several cross-sectional (OLS) regressions in which the per-capita remuneration is the dependent variable. On the right-hand side, we included typical variables identified by the executive compensation literature (firm size, profitability, managerial ownership, ownership structure, and a dummy for stock option plans; see, e.g. Ryan and Wiggins 2001) . We add a dummy variable that indicates whether the remuneration is disclosed individually. In these regressions, we find statistically and economically significant and negative coefficients for disclosing firms. The coefficient values indicate that per-capita compensation is much lower for disclosing firms, by about 250,000 € in 2003, and by about 330,000 € in 2005.
6 Discussion
The German Corporate Governance Code works according to the comply-or-explain principle. When initiated in 2002, the code was given a legal basis through a mandatory declaration of conformity introduced by an amendment to the German Stock Corporation Act.
All firms have to publish an annual statement that documents which recommendations have been met. Non-conformity with suggestions does not need to be declared.
In the first version of the code, the publishing of executive remuneration on an individual basis was included as a suggestion and in 2003 its status was changed to that of a recommendation. We examined the functioning of this type of regulation, using a sample of about 150 German companies. In particular, we analyzed the characteristics of the firms that complied with the code.
In 2002, disclosure was only a suggestion and thus largely voluntary. We found that the only variable that significantly affects the probability of disclosure in our 2002 sample is Tobin's Q. This result is consistent with the predictions of voluntary disclosure models.
The result that Tobin's Q positively affects the probability of disclosure is confirmed in the 2003 sample. We further found that firms that have higher per-capita executive compensation are less likely to disclose. Ownership concentration has a significant, but non-monotonic influence on the probability of disclosure. The probability is highest at a level of free float of slightly below 60% and lower if shareholdings are either highly concentrated or dispersed.
This can be interpreted as evidence of free-rider problems in companies in which ownership is dispersed widely, where small shareholders do not have the power to enforce disclosure. On the other hand, dominant shareholders who can obtain this information by means other than the disclosure in the annual report do not have an incentive to encourage disclosure. In both cases, small shareholders are discriminated against.
Our results also show that, even after controlling for firm performance and size, average percapita compensation has a negative and significant influence on the probability to disclose remuneration packages in detail. This implies that individual remuneration is not disclosed in those cases where it is potentially most interesting.
As a response to the low fraction of disclosing firms, a new law was enacted that mandates disclosure from the 2006 annual report onwards unless the shareholders' meeting grants an exemption from the disclosure requirement. This loophole is exploited by about 30% of the firms in our sample. We analyzed empirically the characteristics of the firms that filed for exemption from the disclosure requirement. The decision to put forward a request at the 2006 shareholders' meeting is related significantly to several firm characteristics. The probability that a firm files for exemption is significantly lower for larger firms. In sum, our findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of the comply-or-explain principle.
Managers can decide not to commit themselves to transparency requirements if the ownership structure and the accompanying monitoring incentives give them the freedom to do so. Most interestingly, managers tend to avoid disclosure in precisely the cases in which binding transparency regulation would be of a great importance: i) if minority shareholders -who 25 cannot push for disclosure -are present and ii) if executive remuneration is particularly high.
Our results further indicate that a mandatory disclosure rule with a loophole provision strengthens the position of small shareholders. . The sample size is reduced to 144 in models 1-3 (the models that include the return on book equity as an explanatory variable) because we had to exclude two firms with negative book value of equity. 
